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1962/10/23

54-M Action

Control: 17385 Rec'd:

OCTOBER 23.

6:21 PM

EUR

FROM: PARIS

Info

TO:

SS G SP

Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 501. OCTOBER 23. 8 PM

BTF INR RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 501, INFORMATION BONN POLTO 70. LONDON POLTO 88, ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS BERLIN POLTO UNNUMBERED.

NAC MEETING OCTOBER 23 - BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - SUMMARY REPORT

PRIVATE MEETING OPENED WITH US REPORT ON KOHLER-KHRUSHCHEV TALK AND GROMYKO'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF WHETHER NAC SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH BERLIN PLANNING IN VIEW CUBAN SITUATION, IT WAS AGREED TO PROCEED WITH BERLIN. .

SG REP REPLIED TO CANADIAN QUESTION ON DEMONSTRATIVE NUCLEAR PLANS. CANADIAN REITERATED SERIOUS DOUBTS RE APPROPRIATENESS THESE PLANS FOR BERLIN PROBES SHORT OF GENERAL WAR. ASKED WHAT FORMULA DESIRED RECORD NAC DECISION ON BERCON/MARCON PLANS, REQUESTED MORE INFO ON RELATION ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES TO MILITARY PLANS, AND EMPHASIZED NEED FOR PERSPECTIVE POLITICAL PLANS BEFORE ACTING ON MILITARY PLANS.

US, FRENCH, UK AND DUTCH ARGUED STRONGLY FOR APPROVAL BERCON/
MARCON PLANS AS CATALOGUE, AND WARNED AGAINST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
VIS.A.VIS SOVIETS OF EXCLUSION NUCLEAR PLANS. LIK STRESSER THAT VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS OF EXCLUSION NUCLEAR PLANS. UK STRESSED THAT NUCLEAR PLANS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH "PROBES" DURING LIVE OAK PHASE BUT REPRESENT ACTION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED IF LESSER MEASURES HAVE FAILED. US POINTED OUT THAT BERCON BRAVO TWO . SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AVAILABLE FOR POSSIBLE USE IN RESPONSE SELECTIVE SOVIET USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS FOR POSSIBLE INITIATION USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO. SG REP THOUGHT BRAVO TWO NOT INTENDED AS REPRISAL BUT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE NATO WILL AND

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR Non-Responsive Info (X) DOWNGRADE TO to (X) S or (  $\_$ ) C, OADR

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
ABILITY. CANADIAN AGREED. US REITERATED UNDERSTANDING BRAVO TWO MIGHT FOLLOW SOVIET LIMITED USE NUCLEARS AND EMPHASIZED IMPOSSIBILITY TYING PLANS TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND NEED FOR FLEXIBLE APPROACH. ITALY AGREED US INTERPRETATION RE BRAVO TWO.

NORWEGIAN AGREED WITH US RE FLEXIBILITY BUT URGED FURTHER CONSIDERATION INPLICATIONS NUCLEAR PLANS. SAID MUST ALSO WEIGH STATEMENT IN SGN APPRAISAL THAT SOME SACEUR'S CIRCUMSTANCES FOR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS GO BEYOND NAC INSTRUCTIONS (PARA 15A). SG REP SAID ONLY CHRCUMSTANCES IN PARA 15C WHICH EXCEED PARA 6 (D)(2) OF NAC INSTRUCTIONS WAS USE OF NUCLEARS TO INSURE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC OPERATION THAT CLEARLY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE BE ACHIEVED. US THOUGHT SACEUR CIRCUMSTANCES IRRELEVANT TO NAC ACTION ON MILITARY PLANS. SAID SACEUR COULD ASK FOR AUTHORITY AT TIME BUT THIS WOULD BE POLITICAL DECISION.

SG REP ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF USE NUCLEARS AT SEA AND READ SGN COMMENT RE BERCON PARA 8, WHICH INDICATED IN EFFECT THAT NAC ACTION ON BERCON/MARCON PLANS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE ADVANCE AGREEMENT THAT AUTHORITY ON USE NUCLEARS WOULD NECESSARILY BE GIVEN COMMANDERS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH POLITICAL DECISION ON EXECUTION NAVAL ACTION INVOLVING HIGH RISK OF REPRISAL.

CHAIRMAN URGED EARLY NAC DECISION ON RESPONSIVENESS MILITARY PLANS TO NAC INSTRUCTIONS BUT ALSO CALLED FOR SUBSEQUENT FULLER DISCUSSION IN CONTEXT OF ALL OTHER ASPECTS PLANNING -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, ALERTS, LEGAL QUESTIONS. URGED COMMENTS ON LEGAL ADVISOR'S PAPER RE NAVAL MEAEURES. ALSO REFERRED IMPORTANCE OF NAC LIAISON WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT LATEST CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS. SG REP REPORTED AGREEMENT WITH GEN. MOORE TO PLACE SGN OFFICER FULL TIME WITH SHAPE FOR THIS PURPOSE. SAID WILL ALSO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH LIVE OAK.

DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURE IN REACHING NAC DECISION RESULTED IN AGREEMENT CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS FOR TIME BEING AND ALSO CREATE DRAFTING COMMITTEE OF NAC AND IS ON WORDING NAC "APPROVAL". COMMITTEE WOULD USE PARA 8(B) OF PO/62/641 AS BASIS BUT WOULD



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CONSIDER ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS. DUTCH, BELGIAN, GREEK AND ITALIAN SAID COULD ACCEPT PARA 8(B) BUT CANADIAN SAID WOULD BE DIFFICULT "APPROVE" NUCLEAR PLANS.

DETAILED REPORT BY AIRGRAM.

FINLETTER

**GDW** 

NOTE: Advance copies to Mr. Tobin (RPM) and SS 10-23-62 CWO-M



